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Abstract—After the European Union’s new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) became applicable in May 2018,
concerns about the legal compliance of public blockchain systems
with rights guaranteed by GDPR have emerged, e.g., on the
“right to be forgotten”. In order to better understand how the
blockchain sector sees the challenges raised by GDPR and how
such their communications could influence their users, this paper
reports our data-driven analysis of GDPR-related public online
communications of blockchain developers and service providers.
Our analysis covers 314 public blockchain systems, and two
different online communication channels: legal documents in-
cluding privacy policies, T&C (Terms and Conditions) documents
and other similar legal documents published on systems’ official
websites and public tweets of their official Twitter accounts.
Our analysis revealed that only a minority (86/314 ≈ 27.5%)
of the investigated blockchain systems had covered GDPR at least
once using one or both communication channels. Among the 86
systems, only 27 systems (8.6%) had at least one legal document
that actually talks about GDPR for the corresponding blockchain
system. We noticed a systematic lack of detail about why and how
the GDPR compliance issue was addressed, and most systems
made questionable statements about GDPR compliance. The
results are surprising considering that the GDPR was enacted
in 2016 and has been in effect since May 2018.
Index Terms—GDPR, blockchain, distributed ledger, data
protection, law, privacy, communication, transparency
I. INTRODUCTION
Technically, a blockchain is a distributed ledger that con-
tains all the transactions that are shared among participating
parties, basically computers, that are maintained by a dis-
tributed consensus algorithm [1]. It exists on a P2P network
where there is not a single central body to manage the
ledger, but every participating node keeps a copy of the
ledger. This concept is called distributed or decentralized
trust, and transactions are validated and authorized by the
consensus of participating nodes in a distributed network. In
addition to being a distributed secure data storage (enforced
by cryptographic hashes, digital signatures, and verification
of multiple agents), new-generation blockchain system now
also provide computer programs a mechanism to self-execute
a set of simple instructions among different parties, via a new
technology called smart contracts that are intended to facilitate,
The paper’s supplementary material is available at http://www.hooklee.com/
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verify or enforce a contract [2]. Depending on what participat-
ing nodes can access data on chain, blockchain systems can
be split into three types: public (permissionless) – anyone can
access, consortium (permissioned) – only authorized parties
can access, and private – only a centralized party can access.
Some people do not consider private blockchains as real
blockchains, and some only see public blockchains as real
blockchains. Most permissioned blockchains are developed
in the context of business-to-business applications, based on
public versions with added access control policies.
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(more commonly referred to by its acronym GDPR) of 2016 is
a new and far reaching regulation concerning data protection,
which became enforceable across the whole European Union
(EU) in May 2018 [3]. As the EU’s most recent attempt to
addressing data protection issues, the GDPR aims to protect
the privacy of any data subject in the EU (not just EU citizens),
regardless of the location of their data, and any personal
data that are collected or processed in the EU (Article 3). In
order to achieve its set goals, the GDPR provides an enforce-
able legal framework of rights for data subjects, whose data
are collected and processed, and corresponding enforceable
obligations being placed on data controllers and processors,
to ensure that data is processed only within a set of stated
principles (Article 5). Data controllers and data processors are
defined within the Regulation (Article 4) and extend to natural
or legal persons, public authorities, agencies or other bodies.
The new legal framework introduced by the GDPR represents
significant steps forward in protection from the EU’s Data
Protection Directive (DPD) of 1995 that it replaces.
The GDPR has created new challenges to the development
and operation of blockchain systems because of some potential
conflicts between a number of key principles in the GDPR and
the technical nature of the blockchain technology, particularly
between the data subject’s “Right to Erasure (‘right to be
forgotten’)” defined in Article 17 of the GDPR and the data
immutability feature of blockchain systems. Such potential
conflicts are echoed in a recent report from the EU Blockchain
Observatory & Forum [4], which says “Public, permissionless
blockchains represent the greatest challenges in terms of
GDPR compliance”. Considering the fact that a number of
other countries (e.g., USA [5] and China [6]) are creating their
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new GDPR-like data protection regulations and more countries
may follow up in future, the problem will soon become a more
global issue beyond the current territorial scope of the GDPR.
Although the GDPR compliance issue has been clearly
identified in the EU Blockchain Observatory & Forum report
[4] for public blockchain systems, we observed a general lack
of direct communications from public blockchain developers
and service providers to their users. This motivated us to
conduct a comprehensive data-driven analysis on GDPR-
related public online communications made by developers and
service providers of 314 public blockchain systems with a
cryptocurrency with a market size greater then $10 million
at the time of our study. We looked at two different online
communication channels for each system: legal documents
including privacy policies, T&C documents and other legal
documents on official websites, and public tweets from offi-
cial Twitter accounts. Our analysis revealed some surprising
results: only 86/314 ≈ 27.5% of the investigated blockchain
systems explicitly talked about the GDPR, and many made
questionable statements about GDPR compliance. Among the
systems that communicated about the GDPR, there was a
systematic lack of detail about why and how GDPR com-
pliance has been or will be achieved. On a positive side,
a very smaller number of (6) systems clearly admitted that
some data subjects’ rights (notably the right to erasure/be
forgotten) cannot be respected due to the technical nature of
the blockchain technology.
The results are surprising particularly considering the fact
that the GDPR was enacted nearly three years ago and has
been in effect for around a year. Given the wide discussion
around the GDPR and the fact that all public blockchain
systems will unavoidably fall into the rather wide territorial
scope of the GDPR (Article 3), it is hard to believe that most
blockchain developers and service providers were unaware of
the relevance of the GDPR compliance issue to their systems.
Our work therefore calls for more urgent research into topics
such as legal aspects of the public blockchain technology,
development of more legally sound technical solutions, human
users’ and organizations’ perception and behaviors, as well as
new data protection laws that are more “future-proof”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section discusses useful background information about
blockchain and related work regarding the relationships be-
tween blockchain and GDPR, which will help the readers un-
derstand the research problem and the results we will discuss
later. Section III explains how we collected and processed
the data we used, with basic statistics of the data. Detailed
observations from our data-driven analysis are reported in
Section IV, and further discussions are given in Section V.
Limitations of the study and future work are discussed in
Section VI, and the related works are given in Section VII.
The paper is concluded by the last section.
II. BACKGROUND: BLOCKCHAIN VS GDPR
In order to assess compatibility of blockchain systems with
the GDPR, let us have a look at different types of personal
data that may be stored on blockchains. The first class of
personal data on blockchain systems are transaction data.
Transactions are not limited to transfer of cryptocurrencies
between pseudonymous individuals. Depending on the un-
derlying application, a transaction can cover personal data
such as financial or medical information relating directly or
indirectly to individuals depending on the use case. Indepen-
dent of the application, nothing prevents a malicious user to
upload personal data of other people to a blockchain. In a
blockchain system, transaction data can appear in three forms:
plain, encrypted, or hashed, the latter two being considered
“pseudoanonymised” but still requiring a reduced level of
protection. The second set of data stored in blockchains that
may qualify as personal data is metadata, which is necessary
to coordinate individuals without centralized intermediaries.
Particularly, public keys (i.e., addresses on blockchain) are
essential metadata used for validating transactions, which have
been recognized by the European Union Blockchain Observa-
tory & Forum as valid personal data [4]. Another examples are
IP addresses that are recorded in some blockchain systems.
To understand the implications of blockchain-based systems
from a privacy perspective, it is important to understand
some key technical characteristics of data on blockchains. The
first one is data immutability, i.e., data cannot be deleted or
changed once added. To be more precise, a blockchain is a
series of data blocks, which are sequentially linked (chained)
together through a cryptographic hashing process, where every
block contains its own hash as well as the hash of the previous
block for verification and sequencing.1 For a hash function,
any differences in input data will produce different output
data. This means that, in blockchain systems, an attempt to
change existing data will cause the hash of the corresponding
data block to no longer match the hash value included in the
next block, thereby breaking the chain. This characteristic of
immutability has been discussed as one of the main concerns
about the GDPR compliance of blockchain systems [9]–[12]. It
would seem that the necessary characteristic of immutability
is incompatible with the stipulated right of data subjects to
require rectification and/or erasure of data under the “Right to
Erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)” in Article 17 of the GDPR.
In other words, the technical nature of blockchain seems
to contradict the “right to be forgotten” as the blockchain
technology implies that changing or omitting existing data
(such as deleting records) will compromise the underlying
trust principles of blockchain. One recommended solution to
this problem is to put personal data off chain and only their
hashes on chain [13], and another is to put encrypted data on
chain and the key off chain (which correspond to the weaker
protection called “pseudonymisation” in the GDPR) [14].
Another key feature of the public blockchain technology
1There are other more advanced distributed ledger technologies based on
a graph-based model (e.g., DAG [7] and hashgraph [8]) rather than a linear
blockchain, but the data immutability feature remains largely unchanged. This
will not significantly influence our discussion in this paper, so we will ignore
such level of technical details and use the term “blockchain” as an umbrella
term for all distributed ledger systems.
that gives rise to questions of GDPR compliance is that
it is public and permissionless, meaning that anyone may,
without authorization, participate in the network as a node.
Such public distributed ledgers, together with a distributed
consensus process, do not require any centralized authority
as a manager, thus leading to a large number of parties
who do not trust and may not even be able to identify each
other2. This potential lack of attribution as well as inherent
anonymity of public distributed ledgers challenge the GDPR
compliance of blockchain systems. Millard et al. discussed this
feature, considering the data protection by design and default
principle elucidated in the GDPR (Article 25), and raised some
questions that need to be addressed [15]. One of the questions
is that this openness leads to a confusion in identifying data
controllers and data processors. Article 25 of the GDPR
places legal obligations on the data controllers to ensure
that “appropriate technical and organizational measures, such
as pseudonymisation” are implemented “both at the time of
the determination of the means for processing and at the
time of the processing itself”. In this context, we can ask
whether each participating node of a public blockchain system
holding a copy of the distributed ledger should be seen a data
controller. In addition, the necessary replication of data on
each node also gives rise to a contradiction to the principle
of “data minimisation” stated in the GDPR [16], [17]. This is
manifested in Article 5(1)(c) of the Regulation, which requires
that the amount of personal data collected must be “limited to
what is necessary” to achieve purposes for which the data
processed. It is further reflected in the purpose limitation
that requires that personal data be “collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed” in
Article 5(1)(b) of the GDPR.
In the GDPR, the data controller is defined as the indi-
vidual or entity who decides the purposes and means of the
processing (Article 4). For any systems that have the potential
to retain personal data, the identification of the data controller
is important in order to determine where these responsibilities
and obligations reside. On public blockchain systems, even
if the system does not store any data that can be definitely
labeled as personal data, the public-key addresses used by
such systems as pseudonyms of participating nodes can still
be considered as personal data, as stated explicitly in the EU
Blockchain Observatory & Forum report (on Pages 19-20)
[4]. This implies that it may be impossible for any public
blockchain system to argue that it does not store any personal
data so the GDPR does not apply. Note that in some situations
the data controller is obliged to conduct a mandatory DPIA
(data protection impact assessment) that requires records of all
processing activities be made and retained (Article 35), which
would require clarifying the whole data storage and processing
chain including responsibilities and obligations of other data
processors involved.
2Several countries, e.g., China, are currently making attempts to regulate
this space to require blockchain users register with state-issued IDs (see,
e.g., https: / /www.theverge.com/2018/10/22/18008640/china- blockchain-
registration-government-id for more information).
A further question raised by Millard et al. in [15] con-
cerns the relationship between controllers and processors;
more specifically, how controllers can instruct processors on
the processing of personal data given the anonymous nature
of public blockchains. In the literature, some researchers
proposed the use of smart contracts to control data access,
usage, and transfer to data processors. For instance, Neisse
et al. proposed a solution based on smart contracts, which
are deployed by data subjects for each data controller or data
processor [18]. This solution allows data subjects (users) to
track how their data are processed by data controllers and
data processors and whether the processing of their data are
compliant with their ex ante consent. In [19] Sousa proposed a
conceptual model where each data subject’s consent is stored
in the data controller’s back-end component, which enables
the regulator to traverse the blockchain whenever a consent
requires verification. In their two recent studies [20], [21],
Loukil et al. proposed a similar approach that converts privacy
policies describing the data subject’s privacy preferences into
custom smart contracts.
In the above discussion, we have mentioned user consent.
The GDPR defines a set of obligations for data controllers
and processors, which include obtaining explicit consent from
the data subject for the processing of any personal data.
Explicit consent means freely given, specific, informed and
unambiguous indication of the data subject’s preferences about
the processing of personal data relating to him or her. In order
to have a lawful basis for processing activity of personal data
by a controller, the data subject must have given consent for
the processing to occur for one or more specific purposes
explicitly. Article 7 of the GDPR sets out a framework for
consent, providing three fundamental principles or rules; con-
trollers are responsible for demonstrating consent was given,
a data subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time,
and finally written requests for consent must be clear. The
regulation also makes it clear that “it shall be as easy to
withdraw as to give consent”. This statement of the importance
of consent is further strengthened by Article 22, which notes
that the data subject has the right not be subjected to automated
decision making unless this kind of processing is based on the
data subjects’ explicit consent. It is made clear that a lack of
explicit consent requires the controller/processor to stop all
automated processing of the data.
In a public blockchain, once a transaction has been made on
the blockchain, the same set of data will be processed by the
all nodes in the chain. Consequently, gaining explicit consent
is essential at the beginning before the download or execution
of the blockchain software. In the literature, there are studies
emphasizing that each executed transaction needs to include
a statement of consent to be acceptable by data subjects [22],
which can be hard to manage for most public blockchain
systems. A proposed solution to this problem is to use smart
contracts to automatically handle consent management [18],
[20], [21], but smart contracts are normally based on a public
blockchain so the solution can be seen circular reasoning.
Yet another important aspect is the territorial scope. In a
public blockchain, anyone can run a node by downloading the
transaction history of a blockchain disregarding the territorial
scope of the laws that regulate the protection of personal data
on chain. However, the GDPR defines a wide territorial scope
(Article 3), which says that the GDPR applies for processing
of personal data of any data subjects (not just EU citizens)
by data controllers and processors in the EU, or personal data
of any data subjects in the EU by any data controllers and
processors for the purposes of providing goods or services
or behavior monitoring [23], [24]. The (pseudo-)anonymous
nature of public blockchains means that it is very hard to
manage the territorial scope, and the only feasible approach is
to assume that the GDPR always applies in all situations.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING
In this section we explain how we selected the public
blockchain systems and how we collected public online com-
munications made by developers and service providers behind
those selected systems.
A. Selection of public blockchain systems
Since the first public blockchain system Bitcoin [25] ap-
peared in 2008, many blockchain systems have emerged in
domains such as supply chain, health care, Internet of Things,
and governmental services [26]. Most public blockchain sys-
tems are associated with one or more cryptocurrencies, which
are used as an effective mechanism for incentivizing people
to participate in maintaining the blockchain [1].
In order to conduct our data-driven analysis of public
online communications of blockchain developers and service
providers, we first needed to decide what public blockchain
systems to choose. Due to the rapid development of new
blockchain systems, there was not a well maintained list of
such systems with the needed indicators for us to consider.
We therefore decided to use associated cryptocurrencies with a
large market capitalization size as a proxy to “reverse engine”
public blockchain systems that are popular among blockchain
users, who are the people our study will benefit. This method
should have missed some public blockchain systems that do
not have an associated cryptocurrency on the market yet, but
we noticed that such systems had been reasonably rare or less
mature (e.g., under development) so missing them should not
significantly skew our results. The use of cryptocurrencies also
naturally allowed us to avoid most permissioned and private
blockchain systems, which rarely use cryptocurrencies because
they do not normally have the need to incentivize participants
(who are normally organizations co-running the system rather
than individuals attracted to an existing system).
To decide the market capitalization size of cryptocurrencies,
we used CoinMarketCap (https://coinmarketcap.com/), a pop-
ular website maintaining a large list of cryptocurrencies with
their market capitalization figures. We used a snapshot of the
CoinMarketCap list captured on 17 April 2019 (08:42:19 UK
time) to all cryptocurrencies with a market capitalization size
greater than $10 million. This led to 320 active cryptocurren-
cies (see Section 1 of the paper’s supplementary material for
a full list), which correspond to 314 valid public blockchain
systems. In this paper we use the term “system” to refer to
the following three different cases: 1) a single cryptocurrency
appearing on a single dedicated website (which is normally
managed by a single company or a group of developers); 2)
more than one cryptocurrency appearing on the same website
and managed by the same company or a group of developers;
3) a single cryptocurrency co-developed/maintained by more
than one company/group of developer (e.g., a company and
a foundation, or a number of collaborating organizations).
Some systems following the above definition may actually
maintained by the same company or the same group of core
developers3, but we did not attempt to consider this due to
the complexity of obtaining such information (which is not
always in public domain).
B. Online communication channels
After investigating the selected public blockchain systems’
websites and other online activities, we identified two main
channels that blockchain developers and service providers
normally make GDPR-related public online communications:
1) legal documents including privacy policies, T&C (Terms
and Conditions) documents and other legal documents
published on official websites;
2) public tweets posted by official Twitter accounts.
There are other online communications we also considered
(e.g., white papers, posts on blogs, web forums and chat
rooms) and did some preliminary analysis, but plan to cover
them more thoroughly in future (see Section VI for more).
C. Data collection and statistics
All legal documents were collected on 23 May 2019, almost
exactly one year after the GDPR became effective.
Among the 314 blockchain systems, 189 ones provided links
to “Privacy Policies” or “Terms and Conditions” (T&C) or
other legal documents on their official websites. The most
common legal documents provided by the systems are privacy
policies where 169 systems provided privacy policies, 128
ones provided T&C documents and 34 other legal documents.
In order to obtain relevant Twitter data, we identified 310
official Twitter accounts and downloaded their most recent
tweets (up to 3,200 tweets for each system due to the limitation
of Twitter’s API).
In order to eliminate documents that do not mention the
GDPR at all, we followed a simple approach by searching for
the keyword “GDPR” or “General Data Protection Regulation”
in each document we collected. Although being simple, we
consider this approach valid as any sensible discussions on
the GDPR should include at least one mention of the word
“GDPR” or its full title. Some basic statistics of results of the
keyword searches are summarized in Table I. Note that one
system did not have any relevant legal documents or a Twitter
account, so the total number of relevant systems is 313.
3For instance, a company maintains two different blockchain systems
associated with two different cryptocurrencies and sets up separate websites
for them as well.
TABLE I
BASIC STATISTICS OF COLLECTED DOCUMENTS MENTIONING GDPR
(BASED ON NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS, NOT DOCUMENTS)
Data Source GDPR Mentioned (%) Total
Privacy Policies 48 (28.4%) 169
T&C Documents 9 (7.0%) 128
Other 2 (5.9%) 34
Twitter Accounts 43 (13.7%) 313
Any Channel 86 (27.5%) 313
Among all the legal documents we used in our study, privacy
policies proved to be the one covering the most relevant
information about the GDPR. However, even for this channel
the ratio of privacy policies that include our two query terms
is still quite low. Figure 1 shows more detailed statistics
regarding how the 314 systems are split into different groups
for each communication channel.
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Fig. 1. Statistics of GDPR mentions in different types of online public
communications by blockchain systems
After the data collection and cleaning process, we manually
inspected all legal documents that mention the GDPR. We
noticed that some legal documents were written on personal
data collected and processed by the websites rather than on
data on blockchains. We eliminated legal documents clearly
written for website visitors only since the aim of the study
is to assess the GDPR compliance of the blockchain software
systems. This led to legal documents of 27 blockchain systems
for further analysis. Within the 27 systems, only 6 ones4 have
legal documents explicitly stating what data are for website
and what for the blockchain software systems. For other
systems, we made an assumption that the legal documents do
cover data on blockchain as well, and reported our findings in
Sections IV and V based on this assumption. If this assumption
4Selected texts from privacy policies of the six “good” systems can be
found in Section 3 of the paper’s supplementary material.
is wrong for some systems, then we will only over-estimate
how well public blockchain systems communicated about the
GDPR compliance issue, which should be better than under-
estimate it since our findings are mostly negative (i.e., public
blockchain systems did not communicate enough about the
GDPR compliance issue). We did a similar process on tweets
collected. We eliminated retweets and general expressions
about the GDPR, which do not give any useful information
about the GDPR compliance issue of the system concerned.
We identified 18 tweets that are directly written to announce
GDPR compliance of the systems mainly posted in May and
June 2018 which are around the date that the GDPR came
into effect. However, there are also tweets that underline the
challenges and question the personal data on the chain.
IV. OBSERVATIONS
A. Legal documents
In our study, we focused on legal documents published by
the systems including privacy policies, T&C documents and
other legal documents that are all written in English. It has
been observed that rights of data subjects provided by the
GDPR are mainly covered in privacy policies where only a
few T&C documents mention some rights and none of the
legal documents provide any related information. For those
T&C documents mentioning some rights, the statements are
also covered in privacy policies, so we decided to focus on
privacy policies for the further analysis.
Privacy policies are pervasive feature of websites and appli-
cations required in many countries with the aim of informing
users about how information about them is gathered and
processed. This allows users to make a more informed decision
on accepting or abstaining from using the website/application.
However, it is a known fact that, in practice, privacy policies,
which make up the largest portion of our dataset, are often not
read by users, hard to understand, and do not support rational
decision making [27]. Consequently, previous studies on ana-
lyzing privacy policies mainly focused on manually assessing
their usability in means of their accessibility, writing quality,
content and evolution over time [28]. There are also manual
assessments that focus on compliance with self-regulatory
requirements, e.g., Cranor et al. evaluated privacy policies of
online tracking companies against self-regulatory guidelines
with the aim of understanding collection and use of sensitive
information and linkage of tracking data with personally-
identifiable information [29]. Similarly, in our study, we aimed
to evaluate the privacy policies of public blockchain systems
against the GDPR and assessing whether they contain suffi-
cient and clear information relevant for users to make privacy
decisions considering theirs rights provided by the GDPR.
There are past studies to interpret policies for users through
natural language processing (NLP) tools [30], [31] and crowd
sourcing [32], [33] as well. However, these efforts will succeed
only if privacy policies contain relevant information. In this
context, we aimed to evaluate privacy policies of blockchain
systems and to check existence of relevant information about
data subjects’ rights provided in GDPR, that can provide
valuable insights into future studies.
We identified several factors that make blockchain systems’
privacy policies very questionable or incomplete in terms of
their coverage for data subject’s rights. First of all, except for
a few ones privacy policies do not make it clear if they cover
the website itself and/or the related blockchain applications,
which leads confusion about the scope of privacy policies.
Second and perhaps surprisingly, only six of the 27 systems
provided information about their applications disclosing the
possible problem to exercise some rights due to the under-
lying blockchain technology. However, even among those six
systems, each right is not covered in an equally transparent
way, e.g., the immutability issue is discussed more than other
rights. Only one policy covers all rights in a transparent way.
In the following, we give our observations on how the inves-
tigated blockchain systems’ legal documents communicated in
a number of key areas of the GDPR. The observations are
based on a categorical encoding scheme that indicates how
each document addresses each area, which is explained in
detail in Section 4 of the paper’s supplementary material.
1) Explicit consent: Ten of the 27 privacy policies do
not provide clear information about how the corresponding
blockchain systems obtain consent from their users. There are
vague statements such as “Our processing of your Personal
Information is based on the consent where you have consented
to our use of your Personal Information”. However, there is
no further explanations about how they obtain it. Four of
the policies state that users will consent processing of their
personal data when they use their Website or the applications.
There are two policies that state that consent is gathered via
use of applications. Eight policies provide better explanations
and state that consent is obtained from the user as they register
to their platforms, submit information to their systems or use
their services. Those policies ask people to actively opt in
and try to meet the standard of an unambiguous indication by
clear affirmative action in Article 4. However, better policies
are given in two other systems where it is required to fulfil
a contract with the user to obtain consent. In those privacy
policies, blockchain systems and the technologies under these
systems are briefly introduced to the users and the policies for
the website services and application are written separately to
avoid possible confusion. The consent is said to be obtained
by the active submission of the wallet address or after the
fulfillment of the contract between user and the system. One
policy does not provide any explanation about this right.
A further interesting issue arising in this area concerns
a data subject’s right to withdraw consent. Nine policies
acknowledge this right explicitly and require the data subject to
send an email to request withdrawal of consent. This compares
with four policies that do not specifically mention the data
subject’s ability to withdraw consent. Further 13 policies claim
to support the right without giving any information as to
how a user can do that. Considering the nature of blockchain
systems and the obvious challenges to allowing a subject the
ability to exercise the right to withdraw consent to personal
data, it is very surprising that only one policy explicitly
states that the immutability of blockchain systems may affect
the users’ ability to exercise some rights. This included the
ability to object to, or restrict, the processing of their personal
data. Another important finding is that even though there are
several conceptual models based on smart contracts proposed
in the literature, with the aim of access control, none of the
blockchain systems offer solutions for controlling data access
including usage, and transfer to data processors.
2) Right to erasure (right to be forgotten): Considering the
immutable nature of blockchain, the right to erasure (right
to be forgotten) is the most challenging data subject’s right
for the blockchain community. However, perhaps surprisingly,
the majority of the privacy policies (21 out of 27 ones) do
recognize the issues and discussions about the right to erasure
but they make claims that personal data can be deleted upon
request by the data subject. Two policies include discussions
on immutable nature of the blockchain and states the impos-
sibility of erasure whereas two propose anonymization as an
alternative solution. One policy claims to cover no personal
data on the blockchain except Wallet IDs on the blockchain,
which are argued as non-personal data.
3) Transparency and portability: Among 27 blockchain
service providers, for 13 systems transparency is limited to
personal data collected solely by the website services, which
leads to some ambiguity about the scope of the policies.
Nine of the policies covered personal data collected by their
applications and only four of the systems are transparent
about keeping the personal data on blockchain. One of those
systems argued that all the data on the blockchain is pseudo-
anonymized so that the data on chain does not reveal any per-
sonal data. One of the systems did not provide any information
about personal data collected by their systems.
The right to data portability assures the possibility of
transferring data “from one electronic processing system to
and into another, without being prevented from doing so by the
controller” upon the request of a data subject. Data subjects
have the right to request their personal data in a common
and easily readable computer format, which is a relatively
easier task compared to other rights such as the right to
erasure. Among the 27 systems, only three of them explicitly
claimed to transfer personal information directly to another
“controller”, where technically feasible. Nonetheless, 10 of
such systems included just the keyword “data portability” in
their policies, claiming that they provide this right to their
users, however they did not elaborate it. The remaining 14
policies do not provide any information about this right.
4) Data retention: The GDPR states that principles of
“data minimisation” require that data is retained only as
long as it serves a necessary purpose, which requires service
providers to give information about how long they are going
to store personal information and the conditions regarding this
procedure. Majority (16) of the blockchain systems’ privacy
policies cover vague statements about this right, stating that
the personal information will be erased if further storage is not
required or permitted by applicable laws. Seven systems are
transparent about the exact conditions or the periods of their
personal data storage practices. Four of them do not specify
any information about this right.
5) Transfer of personal data to third countries or interna-
tional organizations: The GDPR requires the data controllers
to provide information to data subjects about the transfer
of their personal data to third parties, third countries or
international organizations. Considering its distributed nature,
for a blockchain system it is inevitable to transfer personal
data to third parties. During this step of our analysis, we
focused on how service providers had explained the transfer
of personal data related to distributed ledger technology.
Surprisingly, only one system’s privacy policy explicitly states
that interacting with their blockchain systems can lead any
personal data written on the blockchain to be transfered and
stored across the globe due to its global decentralized public
network. Except one, 22 systems’ policies state that that they
may share personal data with third-party services including
law enforcement, government officials and regulators as well
as other service providers that they use to support their
businesses. Four systems’ policies stated that they will or do
not share personal information with third parties beyond the
scopes such as the European Economic Area.
6) Data minimization: “Data minimisation” (British En-
glish spelling in the GDPR) is the principle of storing and
processing personal data that is relevant, adequate and limited
to what is necessary. Two main features of the blockchain
clearly conflict with this principle; storing a copy of all data
on every node and immutability. However none of the privacy
policy we examined, including those from the systems that are
transparent about the immutability nature of the blockchain
systems, has statements underlining this conflict. 22 systems’
policies do not explicitly cover this principle and five of them
provide only very brief explanations such as “Processing of
your data is carried out by the principle of data minimization,
accuracy and limited data storage.”
7) Right of access: The right of access, which has been
reported to be entirely compatible with the blockchain technol-
ogy [34], gives data subjects the right to access their personal
data held by any service provider subject to compliance with
the GDPR. Among privacy policies of the 27 systems, four of
them give detailed information informing the users about their
rights not only to access but also to know whether they process
their personal data and certain information how they use it
and who they share it with. Two systems’ policies provide
relatively limited information and recognize the right to access
personal data limited to the information about how and why
they use it. 13 systems’ policies provide brief information
stating that the users have the right to access their data and/or
a copy of their data in a machine-treatable format. Six of
the systems’ policies provide very brief information and just
cover the name of this right in the list of rights that are
recognized. Finally, two systems’ policies do not provide any
related information about this right.
8) Data protection by design and by default: The GDPR
explicitly mentions the “Data protection by design and by
default” principle in Article 25, which is a data protection law
version of the more widely known “privacy by design and
by default” principle. In order to analyze discussions around
this principle, we focused on explicit mentions of the related
terms “privacy by design”, “data protection by design”, “data
protection by default” and other forms of those words (e.g.,
“privacy-by-design”), which led to only one legal document:
the privacy policy at https://casinocoin.org/privacy-policy/.
This policy only states that “We will need to update this
Privacy Policy from time to time in order to make sure it stays
current with the latest legal requirements and changes to our
privacy by design practices.” This does not give any concrete
information about their practices on privacy by design.
B. Twitter accounts
When we evaluated the tweets posted by the 43 blockchain
systems’ official accounts that mention GDPR in at least one
of their tweets, we identified 16 accounts that had announced
GDPR compliance of their systems. Their tweets announcing
the compliance were mainly posted in May, June or July 2018
shortly after the the date GDPR became enforceable. However,
it was surprising to notice that 11 of those systems did not have
a legal document, which made it impossible to validate their
claims. This finding is valuable for the potential social media
analysis on the GDPR compliance issue. Other than the tweets
that announced GDPR compliance, we identified six tweets
belonging to six different accounts that had claimed their
blockchain systems to be GDPR compliant without giving a
link to explain why. There are six accounts that had shared
negative opinions about the GDPR or the GDPR compatibility
of blockchain systems underlining regulatory challenges.
V. MORE DISCUSSIONS
Our analysis drew a largely negative picture of how public
blockchain systems were communicating about the GDPR
compliance issue. Our study does not give answers to why the
public blockchain community behaved the way we observed,
which will be our future work. However, we can reasonably
speculate that either there was an insufficient level of aware-
ness on GDPR or that the sector was aware of this issue but
simply unwilling to make the sensitive matter transparent to
their users and the general public (maybe out of fear of the
resulting legal punishment or loss of business opportunities).
While most privacy policies are very vague in how and
why the GDPR compliance is (or not) achieved, we noticed
a number of systems whose privacy policies are particularly
transparent. For instance, GNOSIS’s privacy policy (https://
gnosis.io/privacy-policy) warned its users as follows:
“Accordingly, by design, a blockchains records cannot be
changed or deleted and is said to be ‘immutable’. This
may affect your ability to exercise your rights such as your
right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’), or your rights to
object or restrict processing, of your personal data. Data
on the blockchain cannot be erased and cannot be changed.
Although smart contracts may be used to revoke certain
access rights, and some content may be made invisible to
others, it is not deleted.
...
IF YOU WANT TO ENSURE YOUR PRIVACY RIGHTS
ARE NOT AFFECTED IN ANY WAY, YOU SHOULD
NOT TRANSACT ON BLOCKCHAINS AS CER-
TAIN RIGHTS MAY NOT BE FULLY AVAILABLE
OR EXERCISABLE BY YOU OR US DUE TO
THE TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE
BLOCKCHAIN.IN PARTICULAR THE BLOCKCHAIN
IS AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC AND ANY PER-
SONAL DATA SHARED ON THE BLOCKCHAIN
WILL BECOME PUBLICLY AVAILABLE”
The same policy covers the following statements for “Right
to erasure (right to be ‘forgotten’)”:
“HOWEVER, WHEN INTERACTING WITH THE
BLOCKCHAIN WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO EN-
SURE THAT YOUR PERSONAL DATA IS DELETED.
THIS IS BECAUSE THE BLOCKCHAIN IS A PUBLIC
DECENTRALIZED NETWORK AND BLOCKCHAIN
TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT GENERALLY ALLOW
FOR DATA TO BE DELETED AND YOUR RIGHT
TO ERASURE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BE FULLY
ENFORCED. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WILL
ONLY BE ABLE TO ENSURE THAT ALL PERSONAL
DATA THAT IS HELD BY US IS PERMANENTLY
DELETED.”
Five more examples of such transparent privacy policies can
be found in Section 3 of the paper’s supplementary material.
The explicit statements about the challenges in GDPR
compliance due to the nature of blockchain technologies cast
more doubts on other privacy policies’ claims about the GDPR
compliance. It is questionable to assure that those potentially
false claims are due to misunderstanding of GDPR or only
written for ordinary websites’ services without any tendency
to hide details or misdirection. On the other hand, it is also
possible to argue that those systems are capable of handling
GDPR by storing personal data on central databases other than
blockchains by-passing any possible challenge introduced by
the nature of the blockchain technology. Since a few number of
public communications we have covered in our study provides
details about data storage practices within the systems, those
possibilities remain open for discussion.
The lack of transparency about GDPR compliance issues
of blockchain systems could be related to the ongoing devel-
opment phase of such systems. Since some systems have not
produced a working software system yet, it is possible for the
developers to procrastinate those issues. However, due to the
data protection by design principle it is necessary to consider
privacy and data protection principles right from the start.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Although we worked on a comprehensive dataset, there are
limitations of the work that require further studies.
First of all, although our analysis work was assisted by
automated tools, it involved a lot of human efforts and expert
knowledge of people involved (the first three co-authors, and
a number of helpers – see the acknowledgement section), so
human errors and biased judgments are inevitable. We adopted
a protocol to have information of each cryptocurrency checked
by at least two independent human encoders, so we believe the
error rate is low so any errors that may still remain should not
significantly influence the results reported in this paper.
Second, the results we present offer just a snapshot of public
online communications of the studied blockchain systems at
a particular time. Even though we have tried to obtain a
representative data set, it is not an easy task to make this
claim considering the variety of blockchain systems. We have
also limited our in-depth analysis to the ones that we retrieve
by a naive keyword search and we eliminated the ones that do
not cover our keyword ‘GDPR’. It is reasonable to assume the
existence of this keyword in any GDPR related discussions,
however, enriching the query terms with some important terms
in GDPR such as the names of different data protection
principles have a potential to enrich the data set.
In the data-driven analysis reported in this paper, we con-
sidered legal documents and public tweets of official accounts.
There are other important public online communications we
did not cover due to the complexity of collecting such informa-
tion including end user licence agreements (EULAs), official
blogs and emails sent from blockchain systems to their users
that were sent out mostly around 25 May 2018, the date when
GDPR became effective. For Twitter, there are likely more
accounts we should consider in addition to the official one,
e.g., accounts of core developers and senior managers of the
underlying company.
As a result, the results discussed in this paper give only
a partial picture of how blockchain developers and service
providers talked about the GDPR compliance issue publicly
online. In our future work, we plan to look into some other
types of public communications listed below and conduct a
longitudinal analysis of public communications of blockchain
systems. We expect that more blockchain systems will be
captured by this source of information.
The first type of public communications we will consider are
end user licence agreements (EULAs) of blockchain software,
which may mention privacy and GDPR. EULAs are often
shipped as part of software and it is not straightforward
to automate the collection of such information. Considering
most blockchain systems have their software code released on
popular repositories such as GitHub, we plan to develop a
dedicated crawler to automatically search, download, analyze
and extract EULAs. We also envisage that some software
systems may have to be manually inspected if their EULAs do
not follow a standard pattern. We also noticed some blockchain
systems published their EULAs on their websites, so we will
also try to check their websites for collecting EULAs.
Another important source of public communications on
GDPR are emails sent from blockchain systems’ developers
and service providers to their users. Such emails are normally
not publicly available and were sent out mostly around 25 May
2018, the date when GDPR became effective. We plan to run
a crowdsourcing based campaign to solicit such emails from
as many blockchain systems as possible, in order to gain in-
sights about how blockchain developers and service providers
communicated to their end users regarding GDPR. We also
plan to conduct a survey to gather end users’ perception on
GDPR and the GDPR email(s) they received.
For public communications on official websites, we looked
at privacy policies and white papers only. Some blockchain
systems may have explained how the GDPR compliance issue
is addressed on other web pages such as news and press
releases. We therefore also plan to run a more in-depth analysis
of all web pages on selected blockchain systems’ websites to
see if such additional communications can be found.
Yet another potentially important online communication
channel is official blogs. Most systems we studied have official
blogs, but we decided not to include blog articles because of
the human efforts required to analyze such articles.
Our data-driven analysis focused on documents on the
studied blockchain systems’ websites, but such documents
may not be a true reflection of the actual awareness and
understanding of people who are running the systems, i.e.,
blockchain developers and managers of the organizations
involved, on the GDPR compliance issue. For instance, the
online documents may be prepared by lawyers and tweets
written by marketing officers, without a proper discussion with
technical people or senior managers. In our future work, we
will explore the possibility of interviewing some blockchain
developers and key management people of organizations be-
hind selected blockchain systems to get their self-reported
views on the GDPR compliance issue, how their systems
actually store personal data, and on how they decided (not)
to communicate about this issue to their users. This can
be extended to empirical studies investigating how different
blockchain developers and service providers manage privacy
related risks in general. We expect that such empirical studies
will be welcomed by some (if not all) blockchain developers
and service providers since they will benefit from having a
better understanding of the important legal issue.
In addition to the above planned future work, yet another
interesting direction for research is to study how different
demographic factors (country, culture background, gender,
age, size of business, etc.) influence the attitude and decision of
blockchain developers and service providers in terms of GDPR
compliance. Most public blockchain systems have published
their core team members on their official website or in the
system’s white paper, so such demographic information can be
collected. Some statistical factorial analysis can be conducted
to identify factors that have a main effect.
VII. RELATED WORK
The GDPR compliance issue has received increasing atten-
tion from both industry and academia, and there is growing
focus on how applications can be evolved to eliminate the risk
of being declared incompatible. However, due to its relative
recency, studies that conduct data-driven analysis about legal
compliance issues around GDPR are rare.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that
aims to collect and analyse public communications specific to
blockchain developers and service providers. However, there
are some related studies that focus on GDPR awareness for
business. One of the first attempts was performed in 2014 in
Finland, right before the GDPR lifespan, to understand aware-
ness of companies (the controllers of the personal data) and
their willingness to act towards compliance regarding GDPR
[35]. The study showed that he general level of awareness was
low and only 43% of data controllers were aware of GDPR. It
was also reported that only 31% of controllers were planning
to act towards compliance during the time of the study.
Another related study ‘Cyber Security Breaches Survey’
was published in 2018, which is a survey on business and
charity actions regarding cyber security and the costs and
impacts of cyber breaches and attacks in the UK [36]. It covers
in-depth interviews undertaken in January and February 2018
to follow up with organizations that participated in the survey,
as well as higher education institutions. It reported that 38%
of businesses and 44% of charities were aware of GDPR at
the time of the study. On top of this, 13% of businesses and
9% of charities had amended their cyber security policies or
processes specifically in preparation for GDPR.
In [37], Sirur et al. reported the results of interviews
made with several organizations with the aim of gaining in-
depth understanding of real challenges faced by organizations
in engaging with the GDPR. By conducting the interviews,
they found that large organizations had felt compliance was
reasonable and doable. However, the compliance attempts
of general small-to-medium organizations (SMEs) were of
a lower maturity than that of large companies and data
protection focused SMEs. A similar conclusion was reported
by Archibald and Renaud in [38].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have conducted a study based on a large database of
the public communications made by developers and service
providers of 314 blockchain systems including legal docu-
ments (such as privacy policies and T&C documents) on their
websites and public tweets made from official Twitter ac-
counts. We found out that most systems had not communicated
about GDPR. As a general trend, those legal documents lacked
an explicit acknowledgment and warnings to users on the legal
challenges introduced by the nature of the blockchain tech-
nology. In addition, those documents also mix terms for data
on blockchains and data collected for other purposes (e.g., for
websites). Only a very small number (6) of blockchain systems
explicitly explained issues around data on blockchains. The
status of such public communications and disclosure of legal
issues and privacy risks on users is not satisfactory, and we
call for urgent more research into the interfaces between data
protection law and the blockchain technology.
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